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Abstract—This paper presents a novel approach to detection of
malicious network traffic using artificial neural networks suitable
for use in deep packet inspection based intrusion detection
systems. Experimental results using a range of typical benign
network traffic data (images, dynamic link library files, and a
selection of other miscellaneous files such as logs, music files,
and word processing documents) and malicious shell code files
sourced from the online exploit and vulnerability repository
exploitdb [1], have show that the proposed artificial neural
network architecture is able to distinguish between benign and
malicious network traffic accurately.
The proposed artificial neural network architecture obtains an
average accuracy of 98%, an average area under the receiver
operator characteristic curve of 0.98, and an average false
positive rate of less than 2% in repeated 10-fold cross-validation.
This shows that the proposed classification technique is robust,
accurate, and precise. The novel approach to malicious network
traffic detection proposed in this paper has the potential to
significantly enhance the utility of intrusion detection systems
applied to both conventional network traffic analysis and network
traffic analysis for cyber-physical systems such as smart-grids.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) are essen-
tial in modern computing infrastructure to help monitor and
identify undesirable and malicious network traffic (such as
unauthorised system access or poorly configured systems). The
majority of commercial NIDS are signature based, where a
set of rules are used to determine what constitutes undesirable
network traffic by monitoring patterns in that traffic. Whilst
such systems are highly effective against known threats, sig-
nature based detection fails when attack vectors are unknown
or known attacks are modified to get around such rules [18].
As well as struggling to identify unknown or modified
threats, signature based detection in NIDS in real-world
scenarios are frequently plagued by false positives. This is
particularly problematic in the detection of malicious shell-
code - a high impact threat vector allowing attackers to
obtain unauthorised commandline access to both conventional
computer systems and cyber-physical systems such as smart
grid infrastructure - as shellcode patterns can be difficult
to distinguish from benign network traffic [16].For example,
while working as a network security consultant for the Shop
Direct Group (UK) using the network intrusion detection tools
Sguil and Snort from the Debian based Linux distribution
Security Onion, it was noticed that signatures designed to
match shellcode frequently also matched other non shellcode
binaries e.g. dlls as well as jpg image files. The frequency of
these false positives was such that the signatures themselves
ultimately had to be disabled, rendering them useless. This
experience with the false positive problem with shellcode and
signature based systems is very common, Microsoft discuss
this at length in their patent of methods to detect malicious
shellcode with reduced false positives in memory [16].
Shellcode is frequently used as a payload in system pene-
tration tools due to the enhanced access and further leverage
they offer to an attacker [13].
This paper outlines a non-signature based detection mech-
anism for malicious shellcode based around Artificial Neural
Networks. Results presented show that this novel classification
approach is capable of detecting shellcode with extremely
high accuracy and minimal numbers of false positives. The
proposed approach is validated using repeated 10-fold cross-
validation and is then tested with respect to creation of false
positive alerts on a large dataset of typical network traffic file
contents (achieving a false positive rate of less than 2%).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section II
provides a background to intrusion detection systems and
artificial neural networks, before section III provides a brief
introduction to the particular instances that motivated the cre-
ation of this system and the results achieved by the proposed
AI based intrusion detection system. Section IV then concludes
with the main achievements of this research and some potential
avenues for further work.
II. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK
A. Intrusion Detection Systems
The primary aim of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
is to identify when a malefactor is attempting to compromise
the operation of a system. That is to say, cause the system to
operate in a manner which it was not designed to do. This
could take the form of a compromise to the confidentiality,
availability and integrity of the system and the data stored and
controlled by it. Systems could be hosts, servers, Internet of
Things (IoT) devices, routers or other intermediary devices
[17]. Traditionally, at the highest level, intrusion detection
systems fall into one of the following two categories, host
based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) and network based
intrusion detection systems (NIDS). The former being an indi-
vidual device detecting a compromise and the latter detecting
a compromise in transit over a network [9]. NIDS can be
further categorised into anomaly and signature based systems.
Signature based systems form the mainstay of commercial
network intrusion detection systems with anomaly based still
largely a research concept [20] with only a few practical
vendor backed examples. Increasingly alerts and other incident
information generated via an IDS act as a feed into security
information and event management (SIEM) systems, along
with other logs and feeds allowing a more complete view of
a potential incident to be recorded.
B. Artificial Neural Networks
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are a form of machine
learning algorithm inspired by the behaviour of biological
neurons located in the brain and central nervous system [12],
[14]. Inputs to the ANN are typically fed to the artificial
neurons in one or more hidden layers, where they are weighted
and processed to decide the output to the next layer. ANNs
make use of a “learning rule” (often gradient descent based
back-propagation of errors) that allows the set of weights
and biases for the hidden layer and output layer neurons
to be adaptively tuned. This self-adaptive nature means that
ANNs are capable of capturing highly complex and non-
linear relationships between both dependent and independent
variables without prior knowledge [19].
ANNs have been used in a wide variety of classification
tasks across many application domains. In contrast to tradi-
tional classification methods, such as logistic regression and
discriminant analysis, which require a good understanding of
the underlying assumptions of the probability model of the
system that produced the data, ANNs are a “black-box” tech-
nique capable of adapting to the underlying system model [22].
This makes them particularly useful in fields such as decision
support for concealed weapons detection [15], prediction and
classification of Internet traffic [5] , and signature verification
[8] where their ability to adapt to the data, especially in
high dimensional datasets, overcomes many of the difficulties
in model building associated with conventional classification
techniques such as decision trees and k-nearest neighbour
algorithms [6].
ANNs have also been used in several computer security
domains, including the analysis of software design flaws
[4] and computer virus detection [10]. ANN approaches to
detection of multiple types of network attacks have also been
shown to be effective [21], though their application to the
detection of shellcode was not considered.
III. DETECTING SHELLCODE IN COMPLEX NETWORK
TRAFFIC
A. Problem Domain
Detecting shellcode within complex network traffic poses
many challenges for network intrusion detection systems due
to the low-level code (usually machine code), small size,
and frequently obfuscated nature of the exploits. This is
further complicated by the observation that, to signature based
detection methods, the binary patterns in shellcode often look
indistinguishable from many other forms of benign network
traffic.
The work presented in this paper was motivated by the
experience of one of the authors working as a network security
consultant for a major UK online retailer. Using conventional
network intrusion detection tools such as Snort [3] and Sguil
[2] to provide event driven analysis of NIDS alerts produce a
high level of false positives - with many of these alerts being
produced by benign binary and image files. A frequent culprit
of false positives was found to be the delivery of files such as
DLLs via Windows Update.
B. Artificial Neural Network Design
The byte level data from the network traffic dataset used
was converted into integer values to feed into the artificial
neural network. Care was taken to avoid the ”magic numbers”
often present at the start of files, as these would be deceptively
easy for the classifier to find and are possible to spoof
(especially when designing obfuscated shellcode). 1000 bytes
of contiguous data was extracted and used as an input to the
ANN (using zero padding where necessary). Initial exploration
and visualisation of the data showed definite patterns within
different file types (as shown in Figure 1), although there was
considerable variability between files of the same class.
Figure 1. Byte value data of three different file types: top: images, middle:
DLLs, bottom: shellcode
The ANN for these experiments was implemented using the
MATLAB (2016b) Neural Network Toolbox [11]. The optimal
structure of the ANN was found through a grid search process,
with the best structure (in terms of classification accuracy)
for the ANN found to be a multi-layer perceptron (MLP)
with two hidden layers of 30 hidden neurons each. The ANN
structure optimisation used repeated 10-fold crossvalidation
to evaluate the classifier designs. An overview of the final
optimised classifier design is shown in Figure 2. The resilient
backpropagation learning strategy (using a default learning rate
of 0.01 and training for a maximum of 1000 epochs) was used
to train the neural network, with Xavier Glorot initialisation
[7] used to set the initial values of the weights.
Figure 2. Final artificial neural network design
C. Results
The artificial neural network classifier outlined in section
III-B above was applied to the network traffic dataset contain-
ing both benign and malicious files. Repeated 10-fold crossval-
idation was used to ensure that the classifier generalises well
to unseen data. Table I shows the mean (in bold) and standard
deviation of the accuracy, precision, and sensitivity obtained
over 1000 iterations of repeated 10-fold crossvalidation.
Table I
RESULTS OF MALICIOUS FILE CONTENT DETECTION
Accuracy 0.98 (0.01)
Precision 0.97 (0.01)
Sensitivity 0.95 (0.04)
Figure 3 shows a Receiver-Operator Characteristics (ROC)
curve generated using the data for all 1000 iterations of
the repeated 10-fold crossvalidation process. ROC curves are
commonly used to analyse the trade-off between sensitivity
and specificity of classifiers across different classification
thresholds. The area under the ROC curve (reported in Table
II) can be used to characterise the overall discrimination
of a classification model (with a higher value for the area
under the ROC curve indicating that the classifier is better
at distinguishing between the two different classes). The bold
blue line in Figure 3 indicates the average ROC curve across
all 1000 iterations of the repeated 10-fold crossvalidation,
and the gray shaded area indicates the range of ROC curves
produced over the course of all 1000 iterations. The dashed
red line indicates the performance of a classifier which chooses
which class a file belongs to at random (this is considered as
a baseline for the ”worst case” classification performance).
Figure 3. Receiver-Operator Characteristics Curve for Malicious File Content
Detection
Table II
METRICS FOR THE AREA UNDER THE ROC CURVE (AUROC)
Average AUROC 0.98
Standard deviation AUROC 0.02
Maximum AUROC 1.00
Minimum AUROC 0.82
Figure 4 shows the performance of one of the best perform-
ing trained artificial neural network designs on a completely
unseen test set (the file contents in this data set were not used
either for training or in the crossvalidation process). As you
can see the best performing trained classifier has correctly
identified 100% of malicious file contents in the test set,
without any false positives!
The performance of the best trained classifier was also tested
with regards to flagging up false positives on an extremely
large dataset of candidate network traffic data contents. A key
driver of this is that, if a network intrusion detection system
flags up too many false positives, it becomes useless because
any true malicious code is drowned out by benign traffic that
has been misidentified. To test this, data from 400,000 random
files (consisting of a mixture of text files, log files, compressed
and uncompressed music, executables, office documents, and
other miscellaneous file data) was extracted into the same
Figure 4. Confusion Plot for Completely Unseen Test Data
format as expected by the artificial neural network and the
classifier ran on this benign data. Across this large scale dataset
the classifier misidentified 7337 samples (approximately 1.8%
of all the data samples).
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
The intelligent intrusion detection system outlined in this
paper significantly improves upon the performance of signa-
ture based detection methods by utilising an artificial neural
network classifier for the identification of shellcode patterns
in network traffic. The ANN based classifier not only achieves
perfect sensitivity on the test dataset (identifying all instances
of shellcode), it also exhibits excellent precision (minimising
the number of false positives identified). The performance of
the proposed approach was then further evaluated with respect
to the false positive rate by testing on an extremely large
(400,000 samples) set of benign network traffic file content
- where the proposed approach achieved a false positive rate
of less than 2%. Minimising the false positive rate is a major
concern for the application of network intrusion systems in
the real-world, as high levels of false positives result in
an extremely poor signal-to-noise ratio and often render the
system useless.
The research presented in this paper describes an offline
approach to detecting shellcode patterns within data. Work
is currently ongoing to integrate the approach proposed in
this paper into online network intrusion detection systems
and to test on real-time network data, with further real-
time optimisations for live network traffic an active area of
development. Another area identified for further work is the
application of the intelligent approach to intrusion detection
outlined here to other areas of network security such as the
detection of cross-site scripting attacks and SQL injection
attacks on web applications.
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